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Abstract
  In a systemic crisis, many institutions in the ﬁ  nancial system may face a lack 
of liquidity and central banks, as lenders of last resort, have to support them in order 
to ensure their ﬁ  nancial stability. The question is: To what extent the involvement 
of central banks in systemic crises management, by providing liquidity to credit 
institutions, affects their ability to accomplish the central goal of monetary policy - 
price stability?
  To answer this question, through this study, we conducted an empirical 
analysis on the effect which central banks’ involvement in systemic crises management, 
through liquidity support, has on monetary policy objectives, mainly on price stability. 
Using a principal components analysis, we built a Monetary policy index and we 
developed a regression model between this index and the liquidity support provided 
by central banks in systemic crises.
  The conclusion we reached is that the provision of liquidity by the central 
bank to banking institutions in the system affects its monetary policy objectives only 
on the short -term. Speciﬁ  cally, providing liquidity support leads to an increase in 
both monetary aggregates and consumer price index in the ﬁ  rst two years of the crisis, 
after which there is a signiﬁ  cant dilution of this impact. 
  Keywords: systemic crisis; liquidity support; monetary policy; principal 
components analysis; regression model
***
  Assigning the central bank with the responsibility for prudential supervision 
of the ﬁ  nancial system, or part of it, is an issue that generated extensive discussion in 
the literature on the advantages and disadvantages.
  Thus, it was highlighted the synergy between central bank’s responsibilities 
related to prudential supervision and its quality of lender of last resort (Peek, 
Rosengren and Tootell, 2001, Dardac and Barbu, 2005) and the synergy of information 
between prudential supervision duties and central bank’s responsibilities related to 
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the development and implementation of monetary policy, the argument being that 
conﬁ  dential information obtained during the supervision of important institutions in 
the ﬁ  nancial system allows the central bank to make more accurate estimation of 
macroeconomic indicators relevant to monetary policy.
  On the other hand, it was highlighted the conﬂ  ict of interest between the 
quality of central bank as lender of last resort – according to which, in order to 
maintain ﬁ  nancial stability, it has to provide liquidity to institutions experiencing 
difﬁ  culties and which can not obtain these resources on the market - and its monetary 
policy objectives, which may be affected by massive injections of liquidity.
 This  conﬂ  ict of interest seems to be even more important in a systemic crisis, 
when an important part of the ﬁ  nancial system institutions may face a lack of liquidity, 
especially when bank panics or bank runs occur.
  In this context, central banks should make decisions having in view, on the one 
hand, the need to ensure conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial system, to maintain the necessary 
level of liquidity on ﬁ  nancial markets and individual institutions, to limit moral hazard 
in providing resources, and, on the other hand, they must take into account the effects 
that their liquidity support may have on monetary policy objectives.
  Regarding the principles according to which loans of last resort are granted, 
in 1873 Bagehot noted that “in a crisis, the lender of last resort must lend freely at 
a penalty rate, based on guarantees that are marketable under normal times where 
there is no panic”.
  Also, Fecht and Tyrell (2004) believe that lenders of last resort can follow 
two distinct policies in providing liquidity to the ﬁ  nancial sector in a crisis event. 
A  ﬁ  rst option is to provide liquidity in the market by purchasing ﬁ  nancial assets, 
and the second possibility is to assist certain individual ﬁ  nancial institutions facing 
difﬁ  culties. Also, the author demonstrates that, although in minor liquidity crises there 
is no need for loans of last resort, in moderate or severe crises the adoption of one of 
the two options must take into account the structure of the ﬁ  nancial system. Thus, in 
systems dominated by banks, individual assistance ensures a more efﬁ  cient allocation 
of resources, while in market based systems the injection of liquidity into the market 
is more efﬁ  cient.
  Both possibilities were used to manage the global crisis that began in 2007. 
Thus, central banks provided ﬁ  nancial markets and institutions extended liquidity 
support by various facilities: secured loans in local or foreign currency, purchases of 
bonds or other assets (commercial papers, corporate bonds).
  Central banks’ reaction to the current crisis was, as is known, prompt, the 
aim being to restore the normal functioning of various segments of ﬁ  nancial markets 
and, on this basis, investors’ conﬁ  dence in their viability.
  To relax monetary policy and increase the liquidity in the system, central 
banks of most affected countries have proceeded immediately to the reduction of 
monetary policy interest rate, its level approaching zero limit in many cases (Bank of 
England, ECB, Bank of Japan, FED).
  The same central banks decided to stop targeting the interest rate and to 
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liquidity directly, using unconventional strategies for monetary policy purposes. 
These strategies expand the scope for liquidity management operations, regarding the 
acceptance of other than the traditional counterparties, in order to provide sufﬁ  cient 
liquidity in the banking system.
  These unconventional policies represent an additional tool to the management 
of systemic crisis, which complements the function of central bank of lender of last 
resort. Basically, they do not operate solely on the money market, which is the standard 
interface between central banks and the ﬁ  nancial sector, but also on other segments 
of ﬁ  nancial markets, aiming to unlock the main transmission channels of monetary 
policy (interest rate and credit channels).
  Regardless of the unconventional characteristics of monetary policy 
operations implemented, they all involve a substantial change in central bank balance 
sheet, both in terms of size and structure and risk proﬁ  le.
  As Moessner and Allen (2010, p 8) also show, before the crisis many central 
banks pursued through monetary policy, low, but positive inﬂ  ation rates, using as the 
main instrument ofﬁ  cial interest rates. But the crisis and associated risks, including 
deﬂ  ation, has led to changes in central bank policies and instruments: interest rates 
were lowered, central banks provided liquidity to ﬁ  nancial markets including the 
through purchases of assets, all leading to an expansionary monetary policy.
  On this issue, Mishkin (2010, p. 47) shows that before the current crisis, 
the analysis of  central bank’s functions created a dichotomy between monetary 
policy (which aims at price stability) and prudential supervision (aiming at ﬁ  nancial 
stability), but he events that occurred after 2007 in the ﬁ  nancial systems of many 
countries demonstrate an intrinsic connection between the two responsibilities of the 
central bank. Thus, monetary policy can foster credit growth (and the appearance 
of bubbles), with effects on ﬁ  nancial stability, while macro-prudential policies that 
promote ﬁ  nancial stability (through moderating credit growth) may affect monetary 
policy objectives. The author, however, makes no reference to the relationship between 
central bank’ quality as lender of last resort, exercised especially in case of a systemic 
crisis, and monetary policy responsibilities.
  In this context, it seems useful to undertake an empirical analysis to reveal 
whether and to what extent the achievement of monetary policy objectives is affected 
by central bank’s involvement in the management of systemic crises by providing 
liquidity to markets and ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
 
  We included in the analysis a total of 63 systemic crises manifested after 
1980 because, according to Bordo (1990), support for ﬁ  nancial institutions was the 
exception rather than a rule before that date. From these crises, 23 occurred after 
2007, in the current global crisis.
  Using data on these crises, contained in World Economic Outlook and 
International Financial Statistics databases, we developed a regression model between 
the liquidity support provided by central banks, as an independent variable, and an 
index of monetary policy objectives, as a dependent variable.
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  The independent variable
  The operations through which the central bank provides liquidity to credit 
institutions during a systemic crisis and the volume of these operations are not usually 
public information because they may cause a reputational risk which would result in 
massive withdrawals of deposits and / or their inability to borrow in the money market.
  In this context, in order to measure the degree of central banks’ involvement 
in managing crises by providing liquidity support, we used an indicator deﬁ  ned as a 
ratio between the increase in central bank claims on credit institutions in the year in 
which the crisis was triggered  compared with the previous year, on the amount of 
deposits received by them.
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  Laeven and Valencia (2008, p.5) used a similar indicator to deﬁ  ne “extended 
liquidity support”.
  We believe that this approach in building a liquidity support indicator reﬂ  ects, 
both the changes in the balance sheets of central banks (the assets growth) and the 
changes in the funding structure of commercial banks (by reporting the amounts 
received from the monetary authority to total deposits).
  At the same time, we think it is suitable to calculate this indicator for the ﬁ  rst 
year of the crises because liquidity support policies are generally aimed at limiting 
and halting their extension, and they are used in the initial stages of these events. On 
this issue Laeven and Valencia (2010) demonstrated that the amounts provided by 
central banks are withdrawn, on average, within 14 months.
 
  The dependent variable
  The monetary policy stance is difﬁ   cult to assess in periods of calm in 
ﬁ   nancial markets, but it becomes even more difﬁ   cult in times of crisis (when 
uncertainty increases and the interpretation of ﬁ  nancial variables can not be based on 
the regularities and patterns observed in normal times).
  However, in the literature can be found many approaches regarding the 
variables that may represent good indicators of the monetary policy stance. Thus, 
there were used certain indices based on the decisions taken by the monetary 
authorities (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, Romer and Romer, 1989), the growth 
rate of monetary aggregates, credit growth, exchange rate, interest rate (Sims, 1992), 
monetary policy indices constructed using vector autoregressive (Bernanke and 
Blinder, 1992, Bernanke and Mihov, 1998).
  Thus, aiming to deﬁ  ne an index of monetary policy, we considered exchange 
rate and interest rate movements, as the main transmission channels of monetary 
policy, changes in M1 and M2 monetary aggregates during the period [t-1, t +1] where 
t is the year of the crisis event, as intermediate targets and the evolution of consumer 
price index (CPI) as an indicator for assessing the overall achievement of monetary 
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  The preliminary analysis of partial correlation coefﬁ  cients between these 
indicators and liquidity support revealed a statistically signiﬁ  cant correlation between 
liquidity support and variables on monetary aggregates and consumer price index, 
respectively inﬂ  ation rate. For this reason, we constructed an index of monetary policy 
based on these variables on the evolution of M1, M2 and CPI
  To get an accurate picture of the developments in monetary aggregates, 
we used four variables, namely: Percentage increase of M1 in the period [t-1, t], 
Percentage increase of M1 in the period [t, t +1], Percentage increase in M2 in 
the period [t-1, t] and Percentage increase of M2 in the period [t, t +1]. Regarding 
inﬂ  ation, we used two variables, namely: CPI increase during the period [t-1, t] and 
CPI increase during the period [t, t +1].
  We believe that for purposes of this analysis, the method we used in the 
developement of the monetary policy indicator is appropriate, since it will reﬂ  ect the 
attainment of the monetary policy objectives, being also consistent with the principles 
in the literature, which indicate that monetary aggregates can be used as leading 
indicators of economic activity (the most useful indicator is M1) and the evolution 
of prices (the appropriate indicator is M2). At the same time, consumer price index is 
often used to express the inﬂ  ation targets.
  To construct the index we used principal component analysis, a statistical 
analysis procedure which aims at reducing data dimensionality. This method of data 
analysis allows the determination of new variables called principal components, 
which are expressed as linear combinations of original variables. They do not contain 
redundancy and maintain, at the same time, as much of the information contained in 
the initial variables.
  The mathematical model of principal components analysis can be deﬁ  ned 
as: given X1, X2, ... Xn - n original variables that represent characteristics of the 
phenomena under examination, the determination of principal components is achieved 
through a transformation of the form Ψ : Rn → Rk.  By this transformation, an element 
x of the space Rn is converted into an element of Rk space. 
 The  transformation  Ψ is linear, by the type w = At*x, A being a matrix of real 
numbers of n*k size. The determination of the principal components is equivalent to 
solving the following optimization problem (Ruxanda, 2009):
                       
            Max Var(w) 
              x A w
t u {       
  Principal components analysis lead us to the extraction of a single variable 
that explaines 87.556% of the variance of the six original variables. Thus, by using 
the  ﬁ  rst principal component we will only lose a percentage of 12.444% of the 
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Total variance of original variables explained by Monetary policy index 
Table no. 1
Total variance explained
Component
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative %
1 5,253 87,556 87,556 5,253 87,556 87,556
2 ,671 11,176 98,733
3 ,057 ,946 99,679
4 ,016 ,261 99,939
5 ,002 ,039 99,979
6 ,001 ,021 100,000
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
  The percentage of each of the original variables’ variance explained by the 
principal component is presented in Table no. 2
The variance of each original variable explained by Monetary policy index
Table no. 2
Original variable Explained variance of  
each original variable 
Percentage increase of M1 in the period [t-1, t]  91,2%
Percentage increase of M1 in the period [t, t +1] 84,2%
Percentage increase in M2 in the period [t-1, t]  88,4%
Percentage increase of M2 in the period [t, t +1] 92,9%
CPI increase during the period [t-1, t]  85,0%
CPI increase during the period [t, t +1] 83,6%
  We will name the resulting principal component Monetary policy index, 
constructed using the following formula in relation to the original variables included 
in the analysis: 
  Monetary policy index = 0.182* Percentage increase of M1 in the period 
[t-1, t] +0.175* Percentage increase of M1 in the period [t, t +1]+ 0.179* Percentage 
increase in M2 in the period [t-1, t] + 0.183* Percentage increase of M2 in the period 
[t, t +1]+0.176* CPI increase during the period [t-1, t] +0.174* CPI increase during 
the period [t, t +1]
  Thus, higher values of the index will     indicate an expansionary monetary 
policy and higher inﬂ  ation rates, while its lower values     will indicate a restrictive 
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Component Score Coefﬁ  cient Matrix
Table no. 3
Variable
Component Score 
Coefﬁ  cient 
Cresterea procentuală a M1 în perioada [t;t+1] 0,182
Cresterea procentuală a M1 în perioada [t;t+1] 0,175
Cresterea procentuală a M1 în perioada [t;t+1] 0,179
Cresterea procentuală a M2 în perioada [t;t+1] 0,183
Creşterea indicelui preţurilor de consum în perioada [t-1;t]  0,176
Creşterea indicelui preţurilor de consum în perioada [t;t+1] 0,174
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
  To determine a potential inﬂ  uence of central bank intervention in crises 
management through liquidity support on the objectives of monetary policy, we have 
developed a linear regression model between the Monetary policy index (dependent 
variable) and Liquidity support (independent variable), with the following form :
  Monetary policy indexi = c + a* Liquidity supporti + εi
  The estimation of the parameters of this model led us to the following form:
  Monetary policy indexi = -0,393 + 1,587* Liquidity supporti + εi
  The coefﬁ  cients are statistically signiﬁ  cant for a 99% conﬁ  dence level and 
the determination ratio is 59.4%.
The results of the estimation of regression model’s parameters
Table no. 4
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefﬁ  cients
Standardized 
Coefﬁ  cients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -,393 ,119 -3,294 ,002
Liquidity support 1,587 ,217 ,778 7,326 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: Monetary policy index
  The conclusion we reached from the analysis is that the central bank’s 
involvement in crisis management by providing liquidity has a short term inﬂ  uence of 
its monetary policy through monetary aggregates.
  Thus, liquidity support leads both to an increase in monetary aggregates 
during the ﬁ  rst two years of crisis and to an increase in the consumer price index 
during the same period. 
  Performing the same analysis for a period of more than three years showed 
us that this impact is reduced if there are considered long periods of time. Results 
of regression analysis between Liquidity support and Monetary policy index, over 
a period of three years, are presented in Table no. 5, revealing they lack a statistical 
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The results of the estimation of regression model parameters in which 
Monetary policy index is built over a period of three years
Table no. 5
Model Unstandardized Coefﬁ  cients
Standardized 
Coefﬁ  cients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -,101 ,202 -,497 ,623
Liquidity support ,347 ,340 ,183 1,020 ,316
a. Dependent Variable: Monetary policy index - 3 years
Conclusions 
  Given the obtained results, we believe that between the objective of ensuring 
ﬁ  nancial stability, pursued through liquidity support provided by the central bank as lender 
of last resort, and the objective of price stability, pursued through its monetary policy, there 
is a conﬂ  ict of interests in case of a event systemic crisis only for short periods of time.
  These results are also consistent with the analysis of Laeven and Valencia (2008, 
p. 26) who show that monetary policy is generally neutral in a banking crisis period, 
while ﬁ  scal policy is expansionary in order to facilitate recovery of the sector real. 
  At the same time, the conclusions of our empirical analysis conﬁ  rms the 
widespread view in the literature that, on the long-term, ﬁ  nancial stability and price 
stability reinforce each other, although in exceptional times there may be a short-term 
conﬂ  ict.
  On the other hand, these results should be correlated with the effects that 
central bank involvement in crisis management has on the conﬁ  dence in the ﬁ  nancial 
system and on interbank interest rate volatility. 
  Also, the analysis of the consequences of an expansionary monetary policy 
followed by central banks that engage in crisis management should take into account 
recent theories on the need to implement countercyclical macroeconomic policies. 
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